What are the implications of gasoline price volatility for the design of fuel economy policies? I show that this problem has a strong parallel to Weitzman's (1974) classic model of using price or quantity controls to regulate an externality. Changes in fuel prices act as shocks to the marginal cost of complying with the standard. Assuming constant marginal damages from fuel consumption, an application of Weitzman (1974) implies that a fixed fuel economy standard reduces expected welfare relative to a "price" policy such as a feebate or, equivalently, a fuel economy standard that is indexed to the price of gasoline. When the regulator is constrained to use a fixed standard, I show that the usual approach to setting the standard-equate expected marginal compliance cost to marginal damage-is likely to be sub-optimal because the standard may not bind if the realized gasoline price is sufficiently high. Instead, the optimal fixed standard will be relatively relaxed and may be non-binding even at the expected gasoline price. Finally, I show that although an attribute-based standard allows vehicle choices to flexibly respond to gasoline price shocks, the resulting distortions imply that the optimal fuel economy standard is not attribute-based.
Introduction
In October 2012, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) jointly issued new fuel economy standards for U.S. light-duty vehicles. These standards are scheduled to become increasingly stringent over time, reaching a fleet-wide average fuel economy of 55 miles per gallon in 2025. When the standards were issued, the EPA and NHTSA scheduled a "mid-term review" in 2017-2018 to determine whether the standards for 2022-2025 should be revised. Thus, the standards set in 2012 were locked in place through 2021-nine years after the standards were set-and any revisions made in 2017-2018 will be locked in for seven years. The EPA concluded the mid-term review in January 2017, affirming the original 2022-2025 standards. Two months later, however, the new administration opened a review of that decision. This new review is scheduled to conclude in April 2018.
Throughout the debate over the 2022-2025 standards, there has been discussion among industry participants and regulators of whether the standards should be loosened given the substantial decrease in gasoline prices since the standards were set. In October 2012, the prevailing U.S. average gasoline price was $3.45/gallon, but by January 2016 the price had fallen to $1.51/gallon. 1 Because consumers' willingness to pay for fuel-efficient vehicles depends on fuel prices (Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Busse et al., 2013; Sallee et al., 2016) , this decrease in the price of gasoline has increased the cost of complying with the new fuel economy standards and therefore raised concerns as to whether the regulatory path set in 2012 should be sustained. For instance, in April 2015, a spokesperson for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers said that "Given the extremely long 15-year lead time for the standards, the government set a mid-term review in 2017 as a reality check for regulatory assumptions. One of the assumptions was that the price of gas would be much higher than today, and that affects what consumers buy. Sales of our most fuel-efficient vehicles go up and down with the price of gasoline. A mid-term reality check is a good idea, especially since our compliance is based on what consumers buy, not what we offer for sale." (Detroit News, 2015) . Spurred by this policy question, this paper examines the welfare economics of fuel economy standards under uncertain future gasoline prices and therefore uncertain future compliance costs. I begin by framing the problem in the context of Weitzman's (1974) "Prices vs Quantities", which facilitates a welfare comparison of a standard that varies with the gasoline price versus a standard that is fixed in place. I present a model in which the private benefits of fuel economy that accrue to vehicle producers and consumers are moderated by the price of gasoline so that, absent regulation, private agents will choose fuel efficient vehicles when gasoline prices are high and inefficient vehicles when gasoline prices are low. Fuel economy policy is motivated in the model by climate change externalities that are associated with vehicles' fuel consumption per mile. In this framework, a fuel economy standard that varies with the price of gasoline-allowing greater fuel use per mile when the gasoline price falls but tightening when the gasoline price rises-can be equivalent to a revenue-neutral "feebate" that taxes inefficient vehicles and subsidizes efficient vehicles (since under a feebate agents' fuel economy choices would also rise and fall with the gasoline price). Thus, in the language of Weitzman (1974) , a gasoline price-indexed fuel economy standard acts as a "price" policy. In contrast, a traditional fixed standard acts as a "quantity" policy.
To distill intuition, I simplify the model so that, in the absence of uncertainty over future gasoline prices, a feebate policy can achieve the first-best welfare outcome by acting effectively as a tax on gasoline. Likewise, a fuel economy standard can achieve the first-best by acting as a standard on the quantity of gasoline consumed. The key assumption underpinning the paper is that the marginal external damage associated with vehicles' fuel use per mile is locally constant and unaffected by gasoline price shocks. Treating marginal damage as constant in U.S. vehicle emissions is a natural consequence of the fact that CO 2 -the primary driver of the externality-is a global stock pollutant (Newell and Pizer, 2003) . 2 The paper's first result has been intuited by others (Anderson and Sallee, 2016) and is a direct application of Weitzman (1974) : indexing the fuel economy standard to the price of gasoline-or, equivalently, using a revenue-neutral feebate-can achieve the first-best with uncertain fuel prices because it can equate the marginal cost of abatement with its marginal benefit at any fuel price. This result can also be seen as an application of models of general indexed regulation (Ellermann and Wing, 2003; Newell and Pizer, 2008) , where the index variable (the gasoline price) is perfectly correlated with marginal compliance cost. In contrast, a fixed fuel economy standard will result in an excessive marginal abatement cost (and too much abatement) when fuel prices are lower than what was expected when the policy was set, and too small a marginal abatement cost (and too little abatement) when realized fuel prices are high. In either case, there is a welfare loss relative to the first-best.
I focus the remainder of the paper on the question of how best to set a fuel economy standard when it cannot be indexed to the gasoline price and cannot be changed for many years once it is set. Following a first order condition (FOC) from Weitzman (1974) , the usual rule for setting such a fixed standard is to equate the expected marginal cost of compliance, evaluated at the standard, to the marginal external harm. I show, however, that this policy rule ignores the non-trivial probability that if the realized gasoline price is sufficiently high, the standard will not bind. That is, firms and consumers may, if the gasoline price is high enough, voluntarily select a level of fuel economy that exceeds the standard. I derive a new first order condition that accounts for this possibility and show that the optimal fixed standard equates expected marginal compliance cost, conditional on the standard binding, to marginal external harm. This optimal standard is more lax than that implied by the usual Weitzman (1974) rule, and I show that given historic gasoline price uncertainty and estimates of marginal damage from the literature, the difference between the optimal standard and the usual Weitzman (1974) standard can be economically large. In fact, the optimal standard may be so lax that it is non-binding even at the expected future gasoline price. I also derive an expression for the expected welfare loss (relative to the first-best) under a fixed and possibly nonbinding standard, and I show that a standard set using the usual Weitzman (1974) FOC may yield lower welfare than that obtained by not setting any standard at all. Brozovic et al. (2004) also studies optimal pollution control standards that may not bind, using a model with two discrete firm types. The results presented here expand on this prior work by presenting intuitive formulas for the optimal standard and expected welfare loss under a continuous distribution of abatement cost uncertainty, and by calibrating the model to demonstrate that its implications are economically significant for fuel economy regulation. Another related paper is Costello and Karp (2004) , which examines the merits of setting a potentially non-binding pollution standard to learn about a firm's marginal abatement cost. 3 Finally, I study whether basing the fuel economy standard on vehicle attributes such as footprint or weight can mitigate the welfare losses associated with a fixed standard. The U.S. fuel economy standards set in 2012 are in fact footprint-based: vehicles with a large wheelbase are assigned a less stringent standard, as shown in Fig. 1 . Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) shows, using a model similar to that presented here but assuming complete information, that attribute-based regulation (ABR) reduces welfare by distorting choices of the attribute: consumers purchase vehicles that are larger than optimal. 4 When the gasoline price is uncertain, however, ABR may confer benefits by building flexibility into the regulation, as suggested in (Anderson and Sallee, 2016) . For instance, if the gasoline price is lower than expected, agents can shift to vehicles with larger footprints and lower fuel economy, mitigating the increase in the marginal abatement cost. As noted by Lutsey (2015) , this flexibility benefit of ABR was highlighted in General Motors (2009) on the proposed regulation. In addition, the response of vehicle choices to fuel prices was modeled by NHTSA in its Regulatory Impact Analysis (NHTSA, 2012), and Leard et al. (2016) finds evidence that the recent fuel price decrease has indeed modestly affected fleet-average footprint and fuel economy. I show here, however, that even if fuel prices are uncertain, attribute-basing reduces expected welfare relative to an optimally-set non-attribute-based standard, since the distortions caused to the attribute and to fuel economy outweigh the flexibility benefit. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes U.S. fuel economy standards and characterizes U.S. gasoline price volatility, and Section 3 introduces the paper's model of the vehicle market. Section 4 then applies Weitzman (1974) to the comparison of fixed versus gasoline price-indexed fuel economy standards. Sections 5 and 6 then present the main results of the paper: Section 5 discusses the optimal level for a fixed fuel economy standard, and Section 6 assesses whether an attribute-based standard can be welfare-improving. Section 7 discusses the potential importance of several non-modeled factors, such as covariance between the gasoline price and marginal damage, banking and borrowing of fuel economy credits, under-valuation of fuel economy by consumers, and firms' investment dynamics. Section 8 concludes.
economy standard for passenger cars through 2025 (though the standards for 2022-2025 are subject to revision in the ongoing EPA review). For any given footprint, the required level of fuel economy increases over time as technology is projected to advance. In addition (and not shown), light trucks are assigned a separate set of footprint-based standards that are less stringent than those for passenger cars. This separate treatment of passenger cars versus light trucks is essentially a different form of attribute-basing, though on a discrete rather than continuous variable.
Individual vehicle models are not required to meet their fuel economy target shown in Fig. 1 . Instead, each manufacturer must meet a fleet-wide standard based on the aggregated compliance of all vehicles sold, including both passenger cars and light trucks.
5 Moreover, manufacturers can trade compliance credits with one another so that the entire industry faces an identical marginal cost of compliance. Manufacturers may also engage in limited banking and borrowing of fuel economy credits: unused credits may be banked for up to five years or used to cover deficits no more than three years in the past. Ultimately, each year every manufacturer must either produce vehicles that in aggregate comply with its fuel economy target or cover any deficit using credits obtained via trading, banking, or borrowing. 
Gasoline price variation
To motivate the problem of setting fuel economy policy under fuel price uncertainty, this section establishes that U.S. gasoline price shocks have historically been both large and persistent. I use data on gasoline prices obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Panel (a) of Fig. 2 illustrates the time path of U.S. gasoline prices before and after the current fuel economy standards were set in October 2012.
The prices shown are monthly U.S. volume-weighted average refiner prices of motor gasoline for sale to end users, pre-tax, and deflated to January 2016 U.S. dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index for all goods less energy. 7 The price of gasoline has exhibited substantial volatility, ranging from roughly $1.00/gallon to $4.00/gallon since 2000. I use the historical volatility of gasoline prices to generate estimates of the variance of future gasoline prices that policy-makers face when setting fuel economy policy with a long time horizon. Because the distribution of gasoline prices is right-skewed (panel (b) of Fig. 2 ), I assume that monthly price innovations are additive in logs, so that the future price distribution is lognormal. I therefore estimate historic gasoline price volatility by taking the standard deviation of differenced log prices. I use long differences to capture gasoline price uncertainty over time horizons that are similar to fuel economy policy lifetimes. For instance, the 2012 standard is locked-in until 2021-nearly a decade-and may be in effect through 2025 pending the outcome of the current EPA review. The volatility of ten-year differenced log gasoline prices, estimated for January 2000 to January 2016, 8 equals 0.42, equivalent to 52%. 9 The 95% confidence interval for gasoline prices ten years in the future therefore encompasses prices more than twice or less than half of the expected future price. Volatilities estimated using shorter differences naturally result in less uncertainty. The volatility of one-month differences, for instance, is 0.085, and the volatility of oneyear differences is 0.272. Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 199, p. 62644 (15 Oct., 2012 Finally, the data indicate that gasoline price shocks are highly persistent. The monthly AR1 coefficient on the logged gasoline price since 2000 is 0.97, and a unit root cannot be rejected.
11 This persistence is consistent with results on the relative accuracy of no-change forecasts of the long-run real price of oil (Alquist et al., 2013) and relates to evidence that consumers hold no-change beliefs about future gasoline prices (Anderson et al., 2013) .
Model set up
This section introduces the model of the vehicle market that I use throughout the paper. Like the model used in Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) , I impose a number of simplifying assumptions such that, under complete information, either a fuel economy standard or a feebate can attain the first-best because they can mimic a quantity standard or a Pigouvian tax on gasoline. In particular, I assume that consumers have unit demand for vehicles, fully internalize future fuel costs when purchasing a vehicle, and do not respond to per-mile fuel costs when selecting how many miles to drive (i.e., there is no "rebound effect"). I treat vehicle manufacturers as perfectly competitive, and I abstract away from interactions with the used car market and from interactions with other taxes or un-priced externalities.
These assumptions are all strong, and their implications for the efficiency of fuel economy standards are discussed in Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) and many other works. However, abstracting away from these issues conveys the substantial benefit of being able to obtain analytical results and thereby distill intuition for the first-order implications of fuel price uncertainty for fuel economy policy. Moreover, the fact that the model is not precisely tailored to the features of the vehicle market facilitates linking the model to Weitzman (1974) and enhances the generalizability of the paper's findings to other pollution control settings in the presence of uncertain marginal abatement costs. In Section 7, I return to several of the above assumptions, as well as other factors that are not explicitly modeled, and discuss how relaxing them may affect the paper's conclusions. And in Appendix C, I show that the "prices versus quantities" result holds when miles driven respond to per-mile fuel costs, so long as the gasoline price elasticity of driving is not too large. . On the supply side of the market, vehicle manufacturers competitively produce vehicles with a cost function C(e i ,a i ). Reducing the fuel use of any particular vehicle is costly, so that C e < 0, and there are diminishing returns to fuel economy investments, so that C ee > 0. Increasing the attribute a involves convex costs, so C a > 0 and C aa > 0. Finally, letting a represent attributes such as footprint, weight, or horsepower, reductions in e should be weakly more costly for vehicles that have a large value of a. Thus, I assume C ea ≤ 0.
As in Weitzman (1974) and Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) , I assume that the U i (e i ,a i ,G) and C(e i ,a i ) functions can be approximated by second-order Taylor expansions and that all of the U i have identical second derivatives, which substantially improves the model's tractability. 14 Under these assumptions, Appendix A shows that a sufficient statistic for measuring impacts of fuel economy policy on aggregate Fig. 2 . U.S. gasoline price variation. Note: Gasoline price data are monthly U.S. volume-weighted average refiner prices of motor gasoline for sale to end users, obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. These prices are pre-tax and are deflated to January 2016 U.S. dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistic's Consumer Price Index for all goods less energy (CPI series CUUR0000SA0LE).
11 Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of Elliot et al. (1996) , I obtain a test statistic of −1.24 at the Ng and Perron (2001) optimal lag length of 10, relative to a 10% critical value of −2.567. Similar results are obtained if the AR1 regression and unit root tests are carried out in levels rather than logs, or if the full dataset back to 1990 is used. 12 It is convenient to model e i as fuel use rather than efficiency (= 1/e i ) because environmental damage is (locally) linear in fuel use but not efficiency.
also implies that consumers only value fuel efficiency for its monetary benefits, not because of green preferences. To the extent that consumers have green preferences, fuel efficiency could also be viewed as part of the characteristic a that consumers value with diminishing returns.
14 A necessary condition for the assumption that the U eG i are identical is that all consumers share the same annual vehicle miles travelled.
R. Kellogg Journal of Public Economics 160 (2018) 14-32 (utilitarian) consumer welfare is the representative consumer's utility U (e,a,G) obtained from the average vehicle purchased, where e is the average of the e i , a is the average of the a i , and the first derivatives of U equal the average of the U e i and U a i . Likewise, the cost C(e,a) of the average vehicle purchased is a sufficient statistic for aggregate production cost.
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Combining the two sides of the market, define B(e,a,G) ≡ U (e,a,G) − C(e,a) as the private welfare benefit when the average vehicle purchased has fuel use per mile e and attribute a, and the gasoline price is G. B(e,a,G) inherits the property that it can be expressed as a secondorder Taylor expansion, and its second derivatives have the properties B ee < 0, B aa < 0, B eG < 0, B ea ≥ 0, and B aG = 0. I also naturally assume that B e (0,a,G) > 0 and B a (e,0,G) > 0 to allow for an interior private optimum.
Absent regulation, private agents will choose vehicles so that e and a satisfy the private first order conditions (FOCs): B e (e,a,G) = 0 and B a (e,a,G) = 0. I assume that the second order condition (SOC),
, is satisfied, guaranteeing a unique, interior solution.
Externalities from fuel consumption and the social optimum
Let ϕ g denote the constant marginal damage resulting from consuming one gallon of gasoline. 16 Then define ϕ ≡−B eG ϕ g as the marginal damage caused by an increase in a vehicle's fuel use per mile, discounted over the lifetime of the vehicle. The full-information social planner's problem is then given by:
The planner's FOCs are then given by B e (e,a,G) = ϕ and B a (e,a,G) = 0, 17 and the SOC is identical to that in the private agents'
problem. Intuitively, the planner's solution involves a lower e than the private optimum, but conditional on the choice of e the planner chooses the same a as private agents, since the attribute does not create an externality on its own.
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For the results in Sections 4 through 6, it will be useful to discuss the externalities that are included in ϕ g as well as estimates of their magnitudes. The median social cost of CO 2 used by the U.S. Government (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013) for 2015 is $38 per metric ton, with a range from $12/ton to $58/ton under alternative discount rate assumptions, and a value of $109/ton under a "right-tail" damage assumption. These values translate to $0.30/gallon, $0.10/gallon, $0.47/gallon, and $0.87/gallon of gasoline, respectively. 19 In addition to the climate externality, a survey by Parry et al. (2007) considers externalities from U.S. dependency on foreign oil, concluding that "a corrective tax might be anything from roughly 8-50 cents (excluding geo-political costs); a recent panel of experts (National Research Council, 2002 ) recommended a value of 12 cents per gallon". Combining these costs with the climate externality yields a range for ϕ g from $0.18/gallon to $1.37/gallon; I focus below on a "median" estimate of $0.42/gallon. 20 Finally, Parry et al. (2014) 
Prices versus quantities
This section applies Weitzman (1974) to evaluate the welfare implications of a fixed fuel economy standard versus a feebate or, equivalently, a gasoline price-indexed standard. Because I do not consider an attribute-based standard until Section 6, this section and Section 5 will suppress the attribute a so that the private benefit function is simply given by B(e,G).
23 The model proceeds in two stages.
In the first stage, the regulator must commit to a particular level for the standard or the feebate, without knowing what the realized gasoline price will be in the second stage. Then in stage 2 agents choose vehicles conditional on the regulation and the realized gasoline price. I model stage 2 as a single compliance period, though it is straightforward to extend the model so that stage 2 involves multiple compliance periods with different price realizations. Letting G denote the realized gasoline price in stage 2, let F(G) denote the policy-maker's stage 1 rational belief about the distribution of G.
, where G L ≥ 0 and G U is possibly infinite. The expected stage 2 price is G , and the variance of G is σ 2 .
Suppose that a tax is imposed on each vehicle in proportion to its fuel use per mile. Letting τ denote the tax rate, the tax on the representative vehicle is then given by τe. If the tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum, this tax is equivalent to a revenue-neutral feebate that taxes inefficient vehicles and subsidizes efficient vehicles. 24 It is straightforward to see that by setting τ = ϕ, the regulator can achieve the full-information first-best: the feebate is a Pigouvian tax, so it causes agents to perfectly internalize the externalities of fuel consumption per mile at any gasoline price level. This feebate is equivalent to a fuel economy standard that is indexed to gasoline prices so that the targeted fleet-wide average fuel consumption rises (falls) when gasoline prices fall (rise). The feebate, however, involves a substantially lower informational requirement for the regulator than the indexed fuel economy standard: the latter requires information on ϕ and the parameters of B(e,G), while the former only requires information on ϕ. Now suppose that the regulator instead sets a fixed fuel economy standard such that fleet-wide average fuel use per mile cannot exceed the value μ. The "usual" FOC for the solution to the regulator's problem is to equate the expected marginal compliance cost at μ to marginal damage, as discussed in Weitzman (1974) :
where
e e due to the linearity of B e . I show in Section 5 below that Eq. (2) does not yield the optimal standard if there is a possibility that the standard may not bind. Putting that possibility aside for now, the standard implied by Eq. (2) will only yield the firstbest in the event that the realized gasoline price is G . Generically, however, the standard ∼ μ (in gallons per mile) that solves Eq. (2) will 15 The sufficient statistic claims hold for the policies considered in this paper: fuel economy feebates and fuel economy standards that are implemented with cross-manufacturer credit trading, so that the marginal cost of abatement is equated across all vehicle models. In the absence of trading, so that a standard can bind against individual firms or even individual models, changes to the average vehicle sold are no longer sufficient for understanding welfare impacts. 16 Per Weitzman (1974) , the results of the paper are unchanged if ϕ g is defined as the expected value of uncertain marginal damages, so long as the stochastic component of marginal damage is uncorrelated with G. In this case, what the paper describes as "firstbest" is first-best subject to incomplete information about marginal damage. Section 7.1 discusses implications of a potentially non-zero correlation between marginal damage and G. 17 I assume that B e (0,a,G) > ϕ, so that the planner's problem has an interior solution. 18 I am abstracting away from effects of attributes such as footprint, size, and type (car vs. truck) on accident risk, which are examined empirically in Jacobsen (2013) and Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) , and discussed in Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) . 19 Per Energy Information Administration (2011), one gallon of E10 gasoline produces 17.68 lbs of CO 2 .
20 $0.42/gallon is the sum of $0.30/gallon for climate and $0.12/gallon for foreign oil dependency. 21 Parry et al.'s (2014) estimates for the United States are $0.09/gallon for local pollutants, $0.85/gallon for congestion, and $0.37/gallon for accidents, all in 2010 U.S. dollars. 22 Fuel economy improvements will not affect emissions of local pollutants in the U.S.
because these pollutants are regulated under separate per-mile emission standards. Fuel economy regulation will only affect congestion and accidents indirectly via the rebound effect and impacts on vehicles' size and weight. 23 Under non-attribute based regulation, agents will always choose the socially optimal (= privately optimal) level of a conditional on the regulated choice of e. 24 The tax or subsidy on any given vehicle is proportional to the difference between that vehicle's fuel use and that of the average vehicle.
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either be too low (if < G G ) or too high (if > G G ) relative to the first best, resulting in a marginal abatement cost that is, respectively, either too high or too low. The resulting welfare loss is illustrated in Fig. 3 for the simple case where f(G) has two point masses at G L and G U . Given a standard ∼ μ set to satisfy FOC (2), and under the Taylor series approximation for B(e,G), the expected welfare loss per vehicle Δ is equal to a Harberger triangle with height − σB eG (the standard deviation of . This result is a direct analogue of the Δ from Weitzman (1974) in the case where marginal damages are constant, and its formal derivation is given in Appendix B.1.
In contrast, a feebate with τ = ϕ allows the chosen level of fuel use e to shift with the gasoline price, so that the marginal abatement cost B e (e,G) is constant and always equal to ϕ, and the first-best is realized. An appropriately-set gasoline price-indexed standard can achieve the same end.
The price of gasoline during the compliance period is the only source of uncertainty in this paper's model. In principle, it is straightforward to extend the model to also allow for uncertainty about fuel economy technology, since shocks to the intercept of the marginal cost function C e (e) are isomorphic to gasoline price shocks. 25 Including such shocks in the model would increase the variance of the marginal cost of complying with a fixed fuel economy standard beyond the variance caused by gasoline price volatility alone. Moreover, conditioning the fuel economy standard solely on the price of gasoline would no longer be sufficient to achieve the full-information first-best. Instead, the standard would also have to be conditioned on the state of fuel economy technology, which may present practical challenges since technological evolution is more challenging to objectively measure than the price of gasoline.
The optimal level of a fixed standard
Suppose that a feebate or gasoline price-indexed fuel economy standard is not a tool in the regulator's choice set. Instead, the regulator must set a fixed fuel economy standard, knowing that whatever standard it sets will be locked in place for many years. These restrictions are strong, but they are reflective of the way fuel economy policy has been implemented in the United States. As discussed above, the usual, intuitive way to set the standard in this situation, following Weitzman (1974) and expressed in Eq. (2), is to equate the expected marginal compliance cost at the standard to marginal damage. Doing so is equivalent to adding marginal damage per gallon ϕ g to the expected future gasoline price G and setting the standard at the level of fuel consumption per mile that private agents would voluntarily choose at that price. Denote this standard, which solves Eq. (2), by ∼ μ .
This approach to setting the standard is incorrect, however, when uncertainty about marginal compliance cost is sufficiently large that a standard set at ∼ μ may not bind. The problem lies in that fact that, for a sufficiently negative shock to marginal compliance cost, private agents will on their own choose to consume less fuel than what is prescribed in the standard. To see that this possibility is non-trivial in the case of fuel economy regulation, it is useful to compare the variance of future gasoline prices, discussed in Section 2.2, to estimates of ϕ g , discussed in Section 3.2. Looking ten years forward, the 95% confidence interval for the future price of gasoline encapsulates a doubling or a halving of the current price (under a no-change forecast for the expected future price). There exists, therefore, a substantial probability that the price of gasoline may increase by more than $1.00/gallon over a ten-year policy horizon. Such an increase exceeds most estimates of ϕ g . Thus, the realized future price of gasoline may exceed the sum of G and ϕ g , so that a policy set at ∼ μ using Eq. (2) may not bind. Given this possibility, what then is the ex-ante welfare maximizing level of the standard?
First order condition for an optimal fixed standard
To optimally set the level of the fuel economy standard, it is useful to write the regulator's problem in a way that makes clear that there is a critical gasoline price, Ĝ μ ( ), such that for > G Ĝ μ ( ) a given standard μ will not bind:
where e(G) denotes agents' choice of e given a gasoline price realization G. Taking the derivative yields the first order necessary condition for an optimal standard:
Dividing through by F Ĝ μ ( ( )) yields
The first term of FOC (5) is the expected marginal compliance cost conditional on the gasoline price being sufficiently low that the regulation binds. For any standard μ such that Welfare from a fixed fuel economy standard that always binds. Note: e denotes fuel consumed per mile, and B e (e,G) is its marginal benefit. ϕ denotes marginal damage.
Gasoline prices are distributed on {G L ,G U }. ∼ μ is the optimal fixed standard. See text for details.
25 To see this isomorphism, observe that shocks to the intercept of C e (e) (e.g., via a stochastic technology variable η that vertically shifts the affine C e (e) function) result in an identical but oppositely-signed vertical shift to the net marginal benefit function B e (e) (holding G constant), since B e (e,G) = U e (e,G) − C e (e). Gasoline price shocks are isomorphic to these technology shocks because they also shift B e (e) vertically (scaled by B eG ). More generalized shocks to fuel economy technology may change the slope of C e (e): such shocks would not be isomorphic to gasoline price shocks (because they would change the value of B ee ) and would take the model outside of the Weitzman (1974) framework. 26 The terms in the derivative of Eq. (3) from Leibniz's Rule involving dĜ dμ / cancel out. Under the assumption that B e (e,G) is continuously differentiable, this derivative is continuous if f(G) does not have any point masses. If f(G) has point masses (as in the case presented in Figs. 3 and 4, for example), then the derivative will discontinuously jump up as μ increases at each value of μ for which Ĝ μ ( ) falls on a point mass. Because the derivative can only jump up but not down, the optimal standard μ * will never have Ĝ μ ( *) fall on a point mass, so FOC (5) is still a necessary condition for an optimal standard even when f(G) has point masses.
conditional expected marginal compliance cost will be strictly greater than E [B e (μ,G)] from Eq. (2), since B eG < 0. Thus, if the ∼ μ standard that solves Eq. (2) may be non-binding, its conditional expected marginal compliance cost will strictly exceed ϕ, implying that ∼ μ is not optimal. Instead, because B ee < 0, the optimal standard must be more lax-and therefore involve greater fuel use-than the ∼ μ standard.
This principle is illustrated in Fig. 4 , which is similar to Fig. 3 in that the distribution of fuel prices is concentrated on two point masses at G L and G U . In Fig. 4 , however, the standard ∼ μ that solves the Weitzman FOC (2) does not bind if G = G U . If the standard is increased-i.e., shifted to the right-beyond ∼ μ , observe that the welfare loss under the G L price realization decreases while the welfare loss under the G U price realization is unchanged. Thus, expected welfare can be improved by increasing the standard (in gallons per mile). The optimal standard is μ * , where expected marginal compliance cost, conditional on the standard binding, equals marginal external harm ϕ, as prescribed by Eq. (5). For this simple two-point distribution of G, the welfare loss from the optimal standard is actually zero whenever G = G L .
Under more general distributions of G, progress on characterizing the difference between ∼ μ and the optimal standard can be made by making use of the second order Taylor expansion for B(e,G).
, we may write:
e e G e e
Next, note that by the definition of Ĝ,
. Combining this fact with Eq. (6) yields
. We can use this result to replace B e (μ,G) in Eq. (5) and then divide through by − B eG to obtain:
Let μ * denote the solution to FOC (8). The optimal standard μ * has the property that the gasoline price at which the standard binds is equal to the expected gasoline price, conditional on the standard binding, plus the per-gallon marginal damage ϕ g . In the event that the standard always binds (i.e., ≥ Ĝ μ G ( *) U ), FOC (8) reduces to the usual condition that the optimal standard compels agents to choose vehicles that they would have purchased at a gasoline price equal to the unconditional expected gasoline price G plus ϕ g .
The value of Eq. (8) is that it allows a calculation of Ĝ μ ( *)-the gasoline price at which the optimal fuel economy standard will bind-given only a value for ϕ g and a distribution F(G).
27 Table 1 shows the results of solving Eq. (8) for Ĝ μ ( *), using several values for both ϕ g and the time horizon over which the standard will be enforced. Throughout, I assume that the expected price of gasoline, G , is $1.50/ gallon (roughly the same price as that prevailing in January 2016) 28 and that F(G) is lognormal. For a given policy horizon, I obtain the standard deviation of F(G) by averaging gasoline price volatilities (calculated per the discussion in Section 2.2) obtained from gasoline prices differenced over one month (capturing low uncertainty immediately after the policy is implemented) through prices differenced over the specified horizon length (capturing greater uncertainty at the end of the policy's compliance period).
29
The middle three rows of Table 1 use a value for ϕ g of $0.42/gallon, the "median" externality estimate discussed in Section 3.2. Under this estimate of ϕ g , a fuel economy policy that will be committed to for one year-over which the average gasoline price volatility is 25%-has an optimal binding price Ĝ μ ( *) of $1.80/gallon rather than the $1.92/gallon implied by the "usual" policy of setting
g . Policies implemented over five-year and ten-year horizons have optimal binding prices of only $1.65 and $1.60/gallon, respectively. Intuitively, because uncertainty about G increases with the policy horizon, the optimal standard becomes progressively more relaxed as the horizon length increases. Table 1 also presents optimal values for Ĝ μ ( *) when the externality ϕ g equals $0.18/gallon or $1.37/gallon, the lowest and highest plausible values from the estimates discussed in Section 3.2. For ϕ g = $0.18/gallon, the reduction in Ĝ μ ( *) at long policy horizons is pronounced: a ten-year policy has an optimal binding price of only $1.06/gallon. Even for a one-year policy, the optimal standard is actually non-binding at the expected gasoline price of $1.50/gallon. In other words, the optimal standard specifies more gasoline consumption per mile than what private agents are expected to choose in the absence of regulation. In contrast, at ϕ g = $1.37/gallon the optimal policy is not substantially different from setting a standard that binds at + = G ϕ $2.87 g /gallon, even if the policy will be applied for ten years. This result stems from the fact that for such a large externality, it is unlikely that gasoline prices will be so high that the standard will not bind. Thus, Table 1 overall illustrates how, given a distributional assumption on F(G), the difference between the optimal standard and the usual Weitzman (1974) calculation depends entirely on how large the volatility of future prices is relative to the externality, since these magnitudes govern the probability with which the standard will not bind and the size of the corresponding expected welfare loss.
It is important to emphasize that the optimal fixed standard μ * is still inferior from a welfare perspective to a gasoline price-indexed standard or a feebate, as discussed in Section 4. The μ * standard derived here is optimal only subject to the constraint that it is not feasible for the regulator to make the standard contingent on the fuel price. The expected welfare loss Δ per vehicle for an optimal fixed standard μ * that may not bind is derived in Appendix B.1 and is given by (9) Fig. 4 . Welfare from a fixed fuel economy standard that does not bind for a high fuel price. Note: e denotes fuel consumed per mile, and B e (e,G) is its marginal benefit. ϕ denotes marginal damage. Gasoline prices are distributed on {G L ,G U }. ∼ μ is the fixed standard that solves Eq. (2). μ * is the optimal fixed standard that solves Eq. (4). See text for details. 27 Obtaining μ * itself requires knowledge of B eG and B ee . 28 For higher values of G , the variance of the future gasoline price increases, holding volatility (based on log prices) fixed. Because price variance enters Eq. (8) in levels, the difference between Ĝ μ ( *) and ∼ Ĝ μ ( ) will increase with G . 29 For instance, to obtain the one-year horizon volatility of 25% reported in Table 1, I calculate the volatility of one-month, two-month, three-month, …, twelve-month gasoline price differences, and I then take the average of these volatilities. In principle, the exact optimal gas price at which the standard binds should minimize expected welfare losses across the full time horizon over which the standard is applied, rather than be calculated from the average volatility over this time. I adopt the average volatility approach here both because it is more straightforward to implement and because it directly connects to the paper's analytical model, especially Eq. (8).
where σ c denotes the standard deviation of fuel prices conditional on the standard binding.
30 Expression (9) indicates that the expected welfare loss is given by a weighted average of two Harberger triangles. First, with probability F Ĝ μ ( ( *)) the standard will bind, and the expected height and width of the triangle will be proportional to σ c . Second, with probability − F Ĝ μ 1 ( ( *)) the standard will not bind, and the height and width of the triangle will be proportional to the externality ϕ g . Note that if the optimal standard binds for all realizations of G, then Eq. (9) . One way to quantify the expected welfare losses Δ for the parameters used in Table 1 is to express them as a percentage of the losses that would be realized in the absence of any regulation:
. This quantification does not require values for B eG or B ee . These percentage losses are displayed in the right-most column of Table 1 . For optimally-set standards, an intuitive pattern emerges that as gasoline price volatility increases relative to the externality ϕ g , the percentage improvement in welfare generated by the standard is reduced. At the extremes, an optimal policy with a one-year horizon that addressed a $1.37/gallon externality would eliminate 94% of the welfare loss from no regulation, while a policy with a ten-year horizon addressing a $0.18/gallon externality would eliminate only 9% of the no-regulation welfare loss. Table 1 also displays the welfare implications of setting a standard via the "usual" policy of
For the median externality estimate of $0.42/gallon and a policy with a ten-year horizon, this expected welfare loss is 1.5 times that from the optimal standard. 31 The relative welfare loss from adopting the ∼ μ policy rather than the optimal standard increases as fuel price volatility becomes large relative to the externality. In the low externality case of ϕ g = $0.18/gallon, the ∼ μ policy results in more than twice the welfare loss than that from the optimal policy-and a greater loss than that from not imposing a standard at all-even for a policy horizon of just one year. Obtaining expected welfare losses in dollars per vehicle requires values for B eG and B ee . B eG simply represents expected miles driven, discounted over the life of the vehicle. I follow the assumptions of Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) that new vehicles are driven 12,000 miles per year over a lifetime of 13 years, with a 5% discount rate, yielding B eG = 118,359 miles. B ee , the rate at which the marginal cost of reducing e (fuel consumption per mile) increases as e decreases, is more difficult to pin down. I use engineering estimates of the costs of fuelsaving technologies from National Research Council (2015), which estimates "pathways" by which fuel economy can be improved via sequential addition of fuel-saving technology to a baseline vehicle. Fitting an affine marginal cost curve to these estimates, I obtain a value for B ee of $ 1756 per (gallon/100 miles) 2 . 32 Using these estimates, implementing the optimal standard for a ten year policy horizon results in expected welfare losses, relative to the first best, of $12 per vehicle for ϕ g = $0.18/gallon, $42 per vehicle for ϕ g = $0.42/gallon, and $105 per vehicle for ϕ g = $1.37/gallon. Under the sub-optimal ∼ μ standard, the losses are $48 per vehicle, $61 per vehicle, and $105 per vehicle, respectively.
Second order condition for an optimal fixed standard
The results shown in Table 1 assumed that satisfaction of FOC (4) was sufficient for optimality. 33 It is important, however, to consider the second order condition (SOC), which is given by:
We can simplify this condition by using the facts that
The term to the left of the parentheses in Eq. (11) is negative; thus, a solution μ * to FOC (4) is a local maximum iff
When does this inequality hold? First, observe that a standard that never binds
) L is always a solution to FOC (4). At this degenerate standard, however, = F Ĝ ( ) 0, so the SOC clearly fails to hold. A standard that never binds is, therefore, never optimal (unless ϕ g = 0). Second, for a lognormal distribution, as well as many other distributions including the normal and uniform, f(G)/F(G) is decreasing in G (and strictly decreasing within the support of G), with a limit of zero as G goes to infinity. Thus, as μ decreases and Ĝ increases, the SOC must eventually become negative and stay negative forever. 34 There can consequently be only one non-degenerate solution to FOC (4)-the solution obtained in Section 5.1-and this solution will be the globally optimal standard. For other distributions-particularly cases in which f(G) is lefttailed and marginal compliance cost is therefore right-tailed-f(G)/F(G) can be non-monotonic so that the uniqueness of the non-degenerate solution to FOC (4) is not guaranteed. Because gasoline prices are righttailed empirically (Fig. 2) , this issue is likely not relevant for fuel economy regulation, but it may be important for other settings in which regulators set fixed standards and the distribution of uncertain marginal abatement cost is right-tailed. In such cases, solutions to Eq. (4) may be Note: Calculations assume that F(G) is lognormal. Volatilities of 25%, 38%, and 42% are estimated by averaging gasoline price volatilities over horizons from one month to 12 months, 60 months, and 120 months, respectively. The gasoline price Ĝ μ ( *) at which the optimal fuel economy standard binds is calculated using Eq. (8). See text for details. 30 That is,
. 31 The 1.5 figure is the ratio of 87% versus 59% of the loss from no policy. 32 I use the pathways presented in tables 8.4a and 8.4b of National Research Council (2015), which correspond to a midsize gasoline-fueled car under the NRC's low-cost and high-cost estimates, respectively. These pathways account for interactions between technologies as they are added to a vehicle. Using the cost estimates for 2017, I fit a line to the marginal cost curve for the technologies presented in each table. In each case, I drop the highest-cost technology (cooled exhaust gas recirculation level 2) because it is an extreme outlier (its MC is three times that of the next most costly technology) and because it is not required to meet the 2025 standards. I obtain estimates of B ee equal to 1474 using the low-cost estimates and 2038 using the high-cost estimates. The average of these two values equals the $ 1756 per (gallon/100 miles) 2 used in the text. This value is similar to the $ 1941 estimated in Parry et al. (2004) using data from National Research Council (2002) . 33 In this section, I focus on FOC (4) rather than FOC (5) because the latter was obtained by dividing through by F Ĝ ( ), which eliminates the fact that a degenerate standard satisfies the FOC. 34 This property continues to hold as Ĝ increases beyond the support of G; i.e., when the standard always binds (as may be the case, for example, under a uniform distribution for G). Thus, the unique optimum could be a sometimes-binding or an always-binding standard.
local minima or local maxima that are not globally optimal. Furthermore, Appendix B.2 shows that a solution to Eq. (4) that is not the optimal standard will actually yield strictly lower expected welfare than the degenerate standard that never binds iff ϕ g < σ c . 35 This result follows from the intuition that an "interior" standard generates welfare losses that increase with the conditional variance of gasoline prices, while the losses from a degenerate standard increase with the size of the unpriced externality, ϕ g .
Uncertainty and attribute-based regulation
A fixed fuel economy standard, even if set optimally per Section 5, will be too stringent relative to the first-best when the realized gasoline price is low and will be too lax (and may not bind) when the gasoline price is high. This section explores whether the consequent welfare loss can be mitigated by implementing an attribute-based regulation (ABR) that allows vehicle choices to flexibly respond to gasoline price shocks.
Under an affine ABR, the fuel economy standard is given by a function μ(a) = μ 0 + γa. Before formally deriving the optimal standard-which involves optimal values for μ 0 and the slope parameter γ-it is useful to build intuition for agents' vehicle choices under ABR. Fig. 5 depicts choices of a and e both without (γ = 0) and with (γ > 0) attribute-basing. In both panels of the figure, the steep dashed line depicts vehicle choices in the absence of regulation, when a higher (lower) gasoline price G decreases (increases) the choices of both a and e and therefore shifts the location on the line. The slope of this line equals − B aa /B ea . A first-best regulatory instrument such as a gasoline tax or feebate shifts agents' vehicle choices along this line towards lower values of a and e, for any given realization of G.
Panel (a) of Fig. 5 imposes a "flat" non-attribute-based standard of μ 0 = μ * that binds whenever G is less than Ĝ μ ( *) and is optimal conditional on γ = 0, following the discussion in Section 5. When the standard binds, the agents' choice of a always equals a * as shown in the figure, since the optimal a for the agents, conditional on the choice of e, does not depend on the realized gasoline price G.
36 Equivalently, whenever ≤ G Ĝ μ ( *), the level set of agents' private welfare B(e,a,G) that corresponds to the private optimum, subject to the standard, always has a point of tangency at a , agents' choices (corresponding to the point of tangency of the level set) move along the standard to progressively higher levels of a and e.
37 It is in this way that ABR creates flexibility with which vehicle choices can respond to gasoline price shocks. The welfare impact of this flexibility is second-order in γ, since the sensitivity of e to the gasoline price G is second-order in γ in the neighborhood of γ = 0.
38
Panel (b) also illustrates that ABR distorts the choice of a, conditional on e, away from its optimum (which lies on the dashed line of unconstrained choices) whenever the standard is binding. This distortion generates a welfare loss, per Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) , that is secondorder in γ in the neighborhood of γ = 0 (since the welfare loss is a standard Harberger triangle).
39 Panel (b) also shows that, given the rotation of the standard about the point (a * ,μ * ), ABR increases the choice of e, relative to the case when γ = 0, whenever the standard binds.
I now derive the optimal μ 0 and γ. The regulator's problem is given by:
The first order conditions are then given by Eqs. (13) and (14) below, where the notation suppresses the dependence of B e , B a , de/dμ 0 , de/dγ, da/dμ 0 , and da/dγ on μ 0 , γ, and G: . See text for details.
35 Appendix B.2 shows that this possibility extends to cases in which a standard satisfying Eq. (2) always binds. Such a standard will always be a local optimum (since the SOC for an always-binding standard is simply equal to B ee , which is strictly negative) but will nonetheless be inferior to the degenerate standard iff ϕ g < σ, where σ is the unconditional standard deviation of gasoline prices (in levels). 36 This result follows from the assumption that B aG = 0.
37 I assume that private agents' SOC when faced with a binding attribute-based standard, B ee γ 2 + 2B ea γ + B aa < 0, holds, so that vehicle choices lie on an interior optimum. 38 de/dG, which drives the flexibility benefit, is a function of the product of the slope γ with the magnitude of the distortion in a away from the pivot point attribute a * . Both of these effects are first-order in γ as γ increases away from zero, so de/dG is therefore second-order in γ in the neighborhood of γ = 0.
39 If the attribute a itself drives an externality, then the welfare effects of changing γ will be first-order at γ = 0, as discussed in Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) . If increasing vehicle size and weight generates external benefits, then optimal ABR will involve γ > 0 rather than γ = 0 as derived below. Alternatively, if vehicle size and weight drive external harm, such as the accident damages found in Jacobsen (2013) and Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) , then optimal ABR should actually discourage larger vehicles by setting γ < 0.
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Addressing first FOC μ 0 , Appendix B.3 shows that Eq. (13) simplifies to:
Eq. (15) is similar to FOC (7) for the level of the fuel economy standard under no attribute-basing, except that Eq. (15) is pre-multiplied by a term that is constant given γ. Intuitively, when γ = 0 this first term simply equals B eG , so that Eq. (7) is a special case of Eq. (15). 40 Eq.
(15) therefore implies that, conditional on γ, μ 0 should be set so that the price Ĝ at which the standard binds equals Ĝ μ ( *, 0), the same price as for the optimal flat standard. In terms of Fig. 5 , this result implies that the optimal pivot point (a * ,μ * ) for an attribute-based standard is invariant to the slope γ of the standard. Thus, as shown in Fig. 5 , when γ increases, the expected fuel use e rises, so that the overall stringency of the standard effectively falls. Why is the pivot point invariant to γ? The intuition flows from the fact that, when γ > 0, the distortion to the attribute a increases with the stringency of the standard. 41 Thus, as γ increases, the permitted fuel consumption per mile under the optimal standard must rise in order to mitigate the distortion to a. This outcome is accomplished by holding fixed the optimal pivot point (a * ,μ * ).
The fixed pivot point also has implications for the optimal level of γ. One way to view the tradeoff in setting γ is that ABR causes a distortion in a, per Ito and Sallee (forthcoming), but also creates flexibility for vehicle choices to respond to gasoline price shocks. Also important, however, is the fact that ABR increases fuel use, relative to a flat standard, for any fuel price at which the standard binds. ABR therefore does not, as one might have initially expected, cause fuel use to decrease when the gasoline price is relatively high and increase when the gasoline price is relatively low.
This intuition leads to this section's main result that the optimal fuel economy standard has γ = 0 and is therefore not attribute-based. Formally, Appendix B.3 shows that the FOC for γ given by Eq. (14) simplifies to Eq. (16) below, where σ c is the standard deviation of gasoline prices conditional on the standard binding, and it is assumed that the pivot point is set at (a * ,μ * ) so that Eq. (15) is satisfied: 
There are only two solutions to Eq. (16): γ = 0 and γ = −B aa /B ea . The former corresponds to a non-attribute-based standard, while the latter is an attribute-based standard such that the slope of the standard is the same as the rate at which unconstrained private agents trade off a and e. Following Fig. 5 , if the pivot point is fixed at (a * ,μ * ), setting γ = −B aa /B ea allows agents to choose the same vehicles that they would have chosen in the absence of regulation. Optimal ABR therefore involves one of two possible corner solutions for γ: either the standard is flat (γ = 0), or it is so heavily attribute-based (γ = −B aa /B ea ) that the standard is non-binding for any realization of G. These corner outcomes result from the fact that the welfare impacts of both the flexibility benefits and attribute distortions of ABR are second rather than firstorder.
At γ = 0, the SOC for γ reduces to
. Recall from Section 5.2 that if the level of the standard is set so that it not only satisfies FOC (8) (equivalent to FOC (15) when γ = 0) but is also globally optimal conditional on γ = 0, we must have ϕ g ≥ σ c . Since B aa < 0, it then follows that if μ 0 is globally optimal within the set of flat standards, the SOC for γ is satisfied at γ = 0. 42 The globally optimal fixed fuel economy standard therefore has γ = 0 and is not attributebased. Thus, the central insight of Ito and Sallee (forthcoming) that ABR reduces welfare extends to the case when uncertainty over future gasoline prices drives uncertainty over future marginal compliance costs. The intuition for this result stems from the fact that the flexibility benefit of ABR is countered both by the distortion to the attribute and by the increase in expected fuel consumption when the standard binds.
Finally, the γ = −B aa /B ea solution to FOC (16) only satisfies the SOC when ϕ g ≤ σ c , 43 which per Section 5.2 can only happen when μ 0 is set so stringently that a flat standard at μ 0 yields lower welfare than no standard at all. In this case, setting γ = −B aa /B ea , which is equivalent to a non-binding standard at any gasoline price, will intuitively dominate the flat γ = 0 standard. Thus, ABR can be valuable when it is used to mitigate the effects of setting a standard with a level μ 0 that is far too stringent. If the level of the standard is set optimally, however, the optimal fuel economy standard is flat.
7. Additional factors affecting fuel economy feebates or standards under uncertainty
Covariance between gasoline prices and marginal damage
The results in Sections 4 through 6 assume that marginal damage ϕ g is locally constant and unaffected by changes to the gasoline price G. However, if gasoline price changes are driven by shocks to the global economy or global crude oil supply, the path of global CO 2 emissions may shift. This shift will then cause ϕ g to change to the extent that the global marginal damage curve for CO 2 is upward-sloping. If changes in ϕ g and G are positively (negatively) correlated, then the first-best priceindexed fuel economy standard should be more (less) responsive to gasoline price shocks than the price-indexed standard discussed in Section 4. For instance, if a decrease in G is associated with a decrease in ϕ g , the optimal feebate must decrease when G decreases, and therefore the optimal fuel use per mile increases by more than it would have were ϕ g constant.
The sign of the correlation between shocks to ϕ g and G is not obvious a priori, since it depends on whether global demand shocks or supply shocks are dominant in determining crude oil price movements. For instance, a persistent slowdown in the global economy will decrease the path of global CO 2 emissions and therefore decrease marginal damage ϕ g . The reduction in economic output will also reduce demand for crude oil, thereby reducing the price of gasoline. ϕ g and G are therefore positively correlated in this scenario. Shocks to global crude oil supply, however, will drive a negative correlation.
There exists considerable work in macroeconomics that attempts to disentangle supply and demand shocks in the global crude oil market. See Hamilton (2013) and Kilian (2014) for recent surveys and discussion; it is clear from this literature that the extent to which oil price shocks are supply versus demand-driven has varied over time. Baumeister and Kilian (2016) attribute the recent 2014-2015 oil and gasoline price decrease primarily to demand shocks, though positive 40 Recall that Eq. (7) was derived by dividing the FOC through by − B F Ĝ μ ( ( )) eG , so the two FOCs are identical when γ = 0.
41 To see the intuition, observe in Fig. 5 (b) that reducing μ 0 shifts the choice of a away from the dashed line denoting agents' unconstrained (and optimal) attribute choices, conditional on e. Formally, the effect of changing μ 0 on the distortion to a is given by da/ dμ 0 − (−B ea /B aa )(1 + γda/dμ 0 ). Applying results from Appendix B.3, this expression reduces to , which must be strictly negative (assuming the SOCs for the private agents' unconstrained and constrained problems are satisfied). ) both assume that FOC (15) for μ 0 is satisfied. Thus, if SOC (11) for μ 0 , conditional on γ = 0, is satisfied, then satisfaction of the SOC for γ at γ = 0 is sufficient for a local optimum at (μ 0 , 0) (since the SOC for γ already accounts for the cross-terms in the Hessian). Moreover, since satisfaction of the SOC for γ at γ = 0 implies that the SOC is violated at γ = −B aa / B ea , a γ = 0 local optimum is globally optimal if the choice of μ 0 , conditional on γ = 0, is globally optimal.
43 At γ = −B aa /B ea , the SOC is given by
, where Z is the denominator in Eq. (16) shocks to oil production played a role as well.
Banking and borrowing of fuel economy credits
The U.S. fuel economy standards established in 2012 allow manufacturers to bank unused fuel economy credits or borrow credits against future years. This banking and borrowing is a flexibility that in principle can help firms smooth shocks to marginal compliance cost that are driven by gasoline prices. Application of results from Pizer and Prest (2016) -which studies binding dynamic quantity standards under abatement cost uncertainty-implies that even if a fuel economy standard is fixed for many years, the first-best can be achieved if banking and borrowing is permitted (with specific trading ratios) over time horizons that exceed the time elapsed between the regulator's updates to the standard. 44 In practice, however, banking and borrowing are unlikely to help vehicle manufacturers respond to gasoline price shocks under the U.S. fuel economy standards. First, credits may only be banked for up to five years, and they may be borrowed only to cover deficits from no more than three years in the past. These time periods are substantially shorter than the time between policy updates (the standards set in 2012 are locked-in through at least 2021). Second, gasoline price shocks are typically persistent, as shown in Section 2.2, so that a negative shock this year does not imply that the price will rebound next year. Given this persistence, banking and borrowing cannot help firms smooth out compliance cost shocks driven by gasoline price volatility. This point is illustrated in Appendix D using a simple two-period model that examines how the incentive to bank or borrow emissions credits varies with the persistence of gasoline price shocks.
Consumer valuation of fuel economy
What if consumers do not fully value future fuel costs when making a vehicle purchase? If policy-makers have the objective of correcting for not just external damage ϕ but also consumer undervaluation, then the optimal tax on fuel consumption per mile must account for both effects. This paper's model can be extended to accommodate standard models of undervaluation (such as Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Busse et al., 2013; and Sallee et al., 2016) by replacing the B eG term in the private benefit function with λB eG , where λ ∈ [0,1], with λ = 1 connoting full valuation. The optimal tax on fuel consumption per mile is then equal to ϕ + (1 − λ)B eG G. This tax increases with the price of gasoline whenever λ < 1, since the magnitude of undervaluation of future fuel costs increases with the fuel price. 45 To mimic this tax with a gasoline price-indexed fuel economy standard, the standard must be more responsive to gasoline price shocks the greater is consumer undervaluation. Thus, when consumers undervalue fuel economy in this way, the welfare benefit (relative to a fixed standard) of optimally indexing the fuel economy standard to gasoline prices is enhanced relative to the full valuation baseline case presented in Section 4.
Technology, investment, and adjustment costs
Compliance with fuel economy standards requires not just shifting of the fleet-wide sales mix but also design changes and, ultimately, technology innovation. Indeed, the "ramping up" of U.S. fuel economy standards shown in Fig. 1 was designed with technological progress in mind. Compliance costs in practice are therefore dynamic rather than static as modeled here. How might dynamic compliance costs affect the economics of a fixed fuel economy standard versus a feebate?
Under perfect competition, a feebate policy will still attain the first-best with dynamic compliance costs, while the fixed standard will not. The intuition is given in Williams (2012) : while the optimal quantity of emissions abated may phase in over time in the presence of adjustment costs or technology investment, a Pigouvian tax that causes private actors to equate marginal compliance cost to marginal damage at all times is still optimal. Dynamic compliance costs do, however, complicate the equivalence between a feebate policy and a gasoline price-indexed fuel economy standard. In the static model presented in the paper, the price-indexed standard responds immediately to fuel price shocks. In the presence of dynamic compliance costs, however, the optimal price-indexed standard must respond gradually, mimicking how firms would respond to fuel price shocks under the feebate.
When firms that invest in fuel efficiency technology compete imperfectly, the choice between a price or quantity policy may affect the extent to which the level of innovation approaches the social optimum. Montero (2011) and Scotchmer (2011) , for instance, develop models of innovation under price or quantity regulation when innovators have the ability to extract monopoly rents by licensing the technology they develop. The extent to which outcomes from a price or quantity policy deviate from the first-best depends on the size of the innovation, the elasticity of demand for abatement, and the ability of the regulator to commit to its policy.
Conclusion
Fuel economy policy in the United States is beset by the difficult problem that standards enacted remain in place for long time horizons over which the price of gasoline can vary substantially. Gasoline price swings, such as the fall in prices experienced between 2014 and 2015, affect the marginal cost of compliance with a fixed fuel economy standard because consumers' valuation of fuel economy co-varies with the price of gasoline. Following Weitzman (1974) , the first-best welfare outcome can be achieved by allowing the standard, in miles per gallon, to rise and fall with the price of gasoline (and possibly also with shocks to fuel economy technology, to the extent it can be objectively measured), mimicking what would happen under a feebate. In practice, however, U.S. fuel economy standards are updated only infrequently. The standards set in 2012 are locked in place until 2021, and an ongoing EPA review is expected to finalize standards for 2022-2025. During these long regulatory commitment periods, inevitable swings in the price of gasoline will open up a gap between the regulation's marginal compliance cost and its marginal benefit, reducing expected welfare relative to the first-best.
When fuel economy standards are periodically revised, these revisions can take into account fuel prices at the time of the revision. But what then is the optimal standard to set? The usual rule when committing to a fixed pollution control standard is to equate the expected marginal cost of abatement at the standard to marginal external harm. This rule ignores, however, the possibility that fuel price uncertainty (and therefore marginal cost uncertainty) is sufficiently large, and the policy horizon sufficiently long, that the standard set will not actually bind. I show that given historic gasoline price volatility and estimates of marginal damage from the literature, this possibility is sufficiently likely that an optimally-set fuel economy standard is substantially relaxed relative to that prescribed by the usual rule. The optimal fixed standard may in fact be so lax that it is non-binding at the expected gasoline price, since doing so substantially mitigates the welfare losses associated with low gasoline price realizations. Furthermore, I show that while an attribute-based standard does introduce some flexibility by which consumers can vary their vehicle choice with gasoline prices, 44 Pizer and Prest (2016) shows that a "quantity" policy with banking and borrowing can actually improve welfare over a "price" policy, even if marginal damage is locally constant, if: (1) there are not just shocks to compliance costs but also to marginal damage, (2) these shocks are observable to firms, and (3) the price policy cannot be applied retroactively. 45 In an alternative model in which fuel costs become more salient to consumers when the gasoline price is high, so that λ is an increasing function of G, the optimal tax may instead be constant or decreasing in G.
the distortions caused to the attribute and to the expected level of fuel consumption are so costly that attribute-basing reduces expected welfare. While this paper is focused on fuel economy regulation, the concepts and conclusions presented are likely to be relevant for other pollution control settings in which marginal abatement costs are uncertain and marginal damage is locally constant. For instance, the CO 2 standards under the Clean Power Plan relied in part on anticipated reductions in emissions from switching from coal-fired to gasfired electricity generation. However, the cost of fuel switching, and therefore the cost of abatement, depends on the relative prices of coal and natural gas. If natural gas becomes very cheap relative to coal, the regulation may not bind, much like fuel economy regulations may not bind if the price of gasoline rises. Because the price of natural gas has a volatility even larger than that of gasoline, the probability of such an outcome is far from trivial, so that the optimal standard will deviate substantially from the usual Weitzman (1974) calculation. 46 As another example, Borenstein et al. (2016) estimates substantial uncertainty in business-as-usual emissions, and therefore marginal abatement costs, for California's 2013-2020 greenhouse gas cap-andtrade market. In that market, Borenstein et al. (2016) demonstrates that the regulation that is likely to bind is not the quantity standard itself but rather the floor or ceiling on emission permit prices. A potential extension of the results presented here could consider optimal fixed standards in the presence of a ceiling or a non-zero floor on the price of emission permits and therefore marginal abatement costs.
Appendix A. Representative consumer model
Consider a unit mass of consumer types i, each of whom purchases a vehicle with fuel use per mile e i and attribute a i , yielding private benefit
. This section proves that a sufficient statistic for the aggregate private welfare effects of fuel economy policies is the private benefit B(e,a,G) obtained from the average vehicle purchased, where e is the average of the e i , a is the average of the a i , and the first derivatives of B equal the average of the B e i and B a i .
I begin by showing that all consumer types make identical changes to their fuel use and attribute choices when there is a change to either G or a tax τ on fuel use per mile. Given G and τ, consumer i's choice of e i and a i is given by the solution to the system of FOCs
= B e a G ( , , ) 0.
Application of the implicit function theorem yields: 
where it is assumed that the SOC − > B B B 0 ee aa ea 2 holds so that the private problem has an interior optimum. Under the second order Taylor expansion assumptions of the text, each of the derivatives above is a constant scalar that is identical across all types i. Thus, changes to G or to the fuel economy tax τ affect all types identically. Moreover, changes to τ, given G, are one-to-one with changes in e and a, the average fuel use and attribute. Thus, if a fuel economy standard (with compliance credit trading) is used in lieu of a tax, shifts in the standard are isomorphic to shifts in the implied tax τ. Thus, it is sufficient to show that B(e,a,G) is a sufficient statistic for welfare under a tax policy; I do not need to explicitly model a fixed fuel economy standard.
Using the second order Taylor expansion, let B e i and B a i be written as: (23) with (e i − e + e − e * ), and do likewise with the (a i − a * ) terms. After removing terms for which the expectation is zero, and after grouping related terms together, we obtain: 46 Using five-year differences on EIA natural gas prices for the electric power sector (obtained from https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n3045us3m.htm on 19 January, 2018), natural gas price volatility is 64.8%. Given a January, 2016 natural gas price of $3.17 per million Btu (mmBtu), the standard deviation of natural gas prices five years in the future is therefore $2.05/mmBtu. This volatility is large relative to the carbon externality in terms of $ per mmBtu of natural gas. For a social cost of carbon of $38/mton and a January, 2016 electric power sector average coal price of $2.11/mmBtu (coal price data in $ per short ton obtained from EIA's Annual Coal Report (released November 2017), table 34, at https://www.eia.gov/coal/ annual/pdf/table34.pdf, and coal heat content data (mmBtu per short ton) obtained from EIA's Monthly Energy Review, table A5, at https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/ pdf/sec13_5.pdf), calculations from Cullen and Mansur (2017) indicate that a natural gas price decrease of $1.27/mmBtu would have an equivalent effect on power sector emissions as would imposition of a carbon tax at the SCC (I use Equations (2) and (3), and footnote 6, from Cullen and Mansur (2017) to find the natural gas price decrease that would have the same impact on the coal-to-gas cost ratio as would the carbon tax, locally to the cost ratio at the fuels' social cost). Because this $1.27/mmBtu externality is less than the natural gas price volatility (in levels) of $2.05/mmBtu, there is a significant probability that optimally-set electric power CO 2 regulation may not bind. 
The first bracketed term in Eq. (24) is the second order Taylor expansion of B(e,a,G). The second bracketed term is invariant to G or to fuel economy policy, since e i − e and a i − a are constants for each i. Thus, B(e,a,G) is a sufficient statistic for the private welfare effects of fuel economy policy.
Appendix B. Proofs and derivations

B.1. Expected welfare loss from an optimal standard
This section derives Eq. (9) from the main text, which gives the expected welfare loss, relative to the first-best, for an optimal flat fuel economy standard μ * that may not bind.
Define Ĝ implicitly by = B μ Ĝ ( *, ) 0 e . As in the main text, define ∼ μ implicitly by
. Per the second order Taylor expansion, marginal utility is given by
.
When the standard does not bind, rearranging Eq. (25) yields the function e(G) that gives agents' fuel economy choice as a function of G:
If the first-best tax τ = ϕ is imposed instead of the fixed standard, agents' choices are instead given by the function e G ( ):
Using the Taylor expansion
, we may then obtain an expression for B(e(G),G): 
and an expression for B e G G (~( ), ): 
Define Δ to be the expected welfare loss under μ * relative to the first best. Δ is given by:
Let Δ 1 denote the first integral in Eq. (30). Noting that B(μ * ,G) = 0, substituting using Eqs. (27) and (29), and cancelling terms, we obtain
Next, note that if we multiply FOC (7) by B eG , we obtain
Substituting Eq. (32) into Eq. (31) yields:
, Ġ is the expected value of G conditional on the standard binding). Then define 
Returning to Eq. (30), let Δ 2 denote the second integral. Making substitutions using Eqs. (26) - (29), we obtain:
Combining terms yields expression (9) from the main text, which simplifies to the standard Weitzman (1974) , when the standard always binds:
(1 ( ( *))) ). B.2. Welfare from a fixed standard versus a degenerate standard
This section derives the expected welfare benefit δ of a standard μ * that satisfies FOC (4) relative to imposing a degenerate standard that never binds. Reusing notation from Appendix B.1, δ is then defined by:
Applying Eqs. (26) and (28), we can simplify expression (37) to:
Next, apply Eqs. (32) and (34) to obtain . This result can be extended to the case in which μ * always binds (so that = σ σ c 2 2 ) by defining f(G) = 0 between G U and Ĝ μ ( *).
B.3. Optimal attribute-based standard
This section derives expressions (15) and (16)-the FOC for μ 0 and the FOC for γ (conditional on satisfaction of Eq. (15)) from the main text. To begin, it is useful to first write down the private agents' vehicle choice problem subject to a binding attribute-based standard and derive how the choices of a and e vary with μ 0 , γ, and G.
When e is constrained to lie on e = μ 0 + γa, the agents' problem can be written as:
The agents' FOC and SOC, using the notation e(a) = μ 0 + γa are then: The solution to FOC (41), combined with the constraint e = μ 0 + γa, yields agents' choices of e and a as functions e(μ 0 ,γ,G) and a(μ 0 ,γ,G). The implicit function theorem can then be used to establish the following useful derivatives when the standard binds (where the notation suppresses the dependence of B a , B e , da/dG, de/dG, da/dμ 0 , de/dμ 0 , da/dγ, and de/dγ on μ 0 , γ, and G): We next develop simple expressions for B e and B a while constrained. Let (â, ê) denote the pivot point for the standard and Ĝ denote the gasoline price at which the standard just binds (ê, â, and Ĝ are all functions of μ 0 and γ). Because = B G (ê, â, ) 0 a (recall that B aG = 0), we may write the Taylor expansion for B a as:
Along the standard, − e ê and − a â are linear functions of − G Ĝ, per the derivatives given by Eqs. (44) and (43), respectively. Substituting, we obtain: We can then use FOC (41) to obtain B e (e,a,G): We are now in position to begin working with the FOC for μ 0 given by Eq. (13) in the text. To simplify notation, let S = B ee γ 2 + 2B ea γ + B aa .
Sequentially applying the agents' FOC (41) and then expressions (45), (46), and (51), we obtain: 
Next, we can use the FOC for μ 0 , Eq. (53), to simplify further: 
Finally, apply Eq. (34) to obtain: 
Appendix C. Prices versus quantities with a rebound effect
This appendix shows that the main result from Section 4-a feebate delivers greater expected welfare than a fuel economy standard-holds in the presence of a rebound effect, so long as the gasoline price elasticity of driving is not too large. In this setting, neither instrument achieves the firstbest (a gasoline tax is required), and under complete information the feebate and fuel economy standard are equivalent second-best policies. Throughout this appendix, I abstract away from vehicle attributes other than fuel economy, and I assume that all consumers are homogenous.
47
Allowing a rebound effect requires a substantial modification of the model. Let e and C(e) denote the vehicle's fuel use per mile and production cost, as in the main text, and let G and ϕ g continue to represent that gasoline price and per-gallon externality. Let Q denote the consumer's miles driven, and let V (Q) denote the utility from driving, where V ′(Q) > 0, and V ′′ (Q) < 0 and is locally constant. Private indirect utility is then given by:
Note that as V ′′ →−∞ so that miles driven are perfectly inelastic, the model becomes equivalent to that in the main text, where B ee = −C ′′ and B eG = −Q. Because the feebate strictly welfare dominates the fuel economy standard with perfectly inelastic demand for miles driven (so long as f(G) is non-degenerate), it is straightforward to show that, given f(G), ϕ g , and C
′′
, there must exist some arbitrarily small but non-zero value of − 1/V ′′ such that the feebate continues to dominate the standard. That is, the result in Section 4 is robust to a small rebound effect.
To make further progress, consider welfare under the fuel economy standard. For simplicity, assume that the standard always binds (allowing for the possibility that the standard may not bind will further reduce the expected welfare from the standard relative to the feebate). Given a standard μ, the consumer's FOCs are given by
where λ is the shadow value of the imposed constraint. With e fixed at μ, we have dQ/dG = μ/V ′′ ≤ 0 and dQ/dμ = G/V ′′ ≤ 0. The optimal standard then solves:
The FOC is given by:
Applying Eq. (59) and dQ/dμ = G/V ′′ then yields that the optimal fuel economy standard μ * satisfies: * . Expected welfare under the fuel economy standard can then be obtained using the Taylor expansion for V (Q) and the fact that dQ/dG = μ * /V ′′ . Given the standard μ * and a gasoline price G, we have:
Expected social welfare E [W μ ] under the optimal standard μ * is then:
Next consider a vehicle tax of t dollars per gallon per mile. Under this tax, the consumer's FOCs are given by:
Application of the implicit function theorem yields the following derivatives:
47 Allowing for heterogeneity in the intercepts of consumers' marginal utility functions, similar to Appendix A, will here generate heterogeneity in the responses of miles driven and fuel economy to gasoline price shocks. Welfare can then no longer be modeled using a representative consumer.
The consumer's SOC requires that the denominator of each of the above derivatives be strictly negative. As V ′′ →−∞, the derivatives de/dG and de/dt collapse to − Q/C ′′ and − 1/C ′′ , consistent with the main text. Using FOCs (66) and (67), a necessary and sufficient condition for the derivatives dQ/dG and de/dG to both be negative (consistent with empirical observations) is that − eC ′′ /(C′(e) + t) > 1 and − QV ′′ /V ′(Q) > 1, respectively. In other words, the response of fuel economy to the marginal cost of fuel economy, holding Q fixed, must be inelastic, as must be the response of miles driven to the marginal cost of driving, holding e fixed. I adopt these assumptions on these elasticities for the remainder of the appendix.
The optimal fuel economy tax solves:
where Q and e are both functions of t and G. The FOC is given by:
Using the consumer's FOCs (66) and (67) and the derivatives (70) and (71) 
Note that as V ′′ →−∞, Eq. (74) simplifies to t = ϕ g Q = ϕ, consistent with the main text. More generally, when V ′′ is real valued the level of fuel economy under the optimal tax and at the average gasoline price G will differ from the optimal fuel economy standard μ * given by Eq. (63), since the response of Q to shocks to G differs between these two instruments. The goal of this section is to compare expected welfare under the optimal tax, E[W t ], to expected welfare under the optimal standard, E[W μ ]. A tractable comparison requires the use of Taylor expansions for V (Q) and C(e) under the tax locally to μ * and Q * as defined by Eq. (63) and
* . Because the difference between μ * and e G ( ) under the optimal tax is not tractable owing to the integrals in Eq. (74), I instead calculate expected welfare for the tax assuming that the tax is set so that, at G , the realized fuel economy is μ * and the realized miles driven are Q * . The difference in expected welfare between the tax and standard policies that I derive will then be a lower bound on the actual difference between the optimal tax and the optimal standard. For tractability, I assume that dQ/dG and de/dG are locally constant; i.e., I approximate these derivatives at G . The Taylor expansions for V (Q) and C(e) around Q * and μ * can then be expressed as a quadratic functions of − G G : Define Δ as the difference in expected welfare between the optimal tax and the optimal standard. Given a non-optimal tax, the Taylor approximations, and the approximations on dQ/dG and de/dG, we have: 
where all dQ/dG and de/dG terms pertain to these derivatives under the tax. Simplifying further yields: 
where the inequality comes from the fact that de/dG ≥−Q * /C ′′ per Eq. (69).
Using Eqs. (77) and (78) 
where + ε G ϕ g is the gasoline price elasticity of miles driven, holding e constant, at a gasoline price of G + ϕ g . Eq. (79) suggests that the optimal fuel economy tax will yield greater expected welfare than the optimal fuel economy standard so long as the magnitude of + ε G ϕ g is less than roughly 0.5. This value exceeds recent elasticity estimates with magnitudes between 0.27 and 0.35 from Levin et al. (2017) Why does the advantage of the tax over the standard diminish with the rebound effect? The intuition flows from the fact that, under the tax, fuel economy responds more strongly to gasoline price shocks than what is socially optimal.
50 The magnitude of this over-response increases with the responsiveness of miles driven to the cost of driving. Eventually, if the magnitude of + ε G ϕ g is large enough, it is better to have a fixed fuel economy standard (which yields insufficient responsiveness of e to G) than a fuel economy tax (too much responsiveness of e to G).
Appendix D. Banking and borrowing
This appendix presents a model involving two compliance periods, in which firms can bank or borrow emissions credits across the two periods. The main result is that if fuel price shocks are persistent across periods, there is no incentive to bank or borrow credits. Mean-reverting fuel price expectations will, however, lead to some banking or borrowing.
Let μ denote the imposed standard, which must hold on average across the two periods. Let G 1 and G 2 denote the first and second period gasoline prices, and let e 1 and e 2 denote the first and second period choices of fuel consumption per mile. The policy requires that μ = (e 1 + e 2 )/2. Permits may be freely banked or borrowed across periods, and for simplicity I assume that the discount rate between periods is zero. The unconditional expected gasoline price in both periods is G . Let the standard μ be set optimally, and suppose for simplicity that the standard is guaranteed to bind. It must then be that the Taylor approximation for the derivative of the single-period private benefits function with respect to e is given by: . Thus, α = 1 represents an expectation that fuel price shocks are persistent, and α = 0 represents an expectation that fuel price shocks are white noise around G . Intermediate values of α denote a positively serially correlated AR(1) process for G, with a long-run mean of G . Now consider the agents' optimal choice of e 1 given G 1 . The total private benefits function, noting that e 2 = 2μ − e 1 , is given by: 
. Thus, if fuel prices are persistent (consistent with Section 2.2) so that α = 1, then agents' optimal choice of e 1 is μ regardless of the realization of G 1 . Thus, fuel economy matches the standard in both periods, and there is no banking or borrowing. In contrast, if fuel prices are mean reverting so that α < 1, then e 1 will be greater (less) than μ if G 1 is less (greater) than G , signifying borrowing (banking).
